Considerations on the Evolution of War

[LRRPF52]

We seem to have gotten bogged down in the morass of caliber-specific arguments and have lost sight of the basic question.

Let's reset with a summary of the Gen III capable assets as listed above.

Then let's refine our mental pictures of what small-unit operations in Gen IV our troops would likely see. We already know differences exist but let's see of we can spell them out. One of the specific questions to be explored is whether these troops will look like Spec Ops forces with significant latitude in weapons drawn for missions or more like line troops with limited training and little or no options for weapons beyond standard issue.

Last for this thread anyway, would be a qualitative description of what that small unit needs if it is built on the Spec Ops model or one the line unit model.

Only after fleshing these questions out can we embark on meaningful discussions of calibers, cartridges, and so on.

This really cuts to the heart of the discussion. If the military just attempts to adapt to the taskings without fundamentally adapting doctrine and force flexibility, it doesn't matter what calibers are issued-they're going to go in unprepared, and a small minority of real performers will have to fight the organization and the enemy simultaneously.

If the organization miraculously focuses on doctrine, training, and true professional development, with the flexibility to tailor the force, they will efficiently get it done with existing systems in inventory. A new toy might make one marginal aspect of the huge pie taste a bit better, but it will still be a certain flavor of pie, barely distinguishable from the other.