04-11-2014, 07:15 PM
Soldier's load and logistics at the boot level will never justify going to a larger, heavier cartridge for most soldiers. Short story: 5.56 NATO and 5.45x39 are not going away anytime soon, especially considering what percentage of soldier's outside of combat units, as well as inside direct infantry units actually focus on closing with and destroying the enemy with small arms fire (not many of them).
The question then becomes, how do we increase the load-carrying capability of belt-fed weapons, to include vehicle-mounted ones, which do the most killing anyway.
Michael, thanks for your comments. They are an excellent summary of the concepts of force structuring and defense matters when taking a realistic view into account. The implications for dismounted and mounted blue force combatants turns away from 19th century regimentation structures, and really calls on organizational flexibility for mission types, ambiguities in regional, cultural, and political dynamics, with limited and precise application of violence in the events that call for it.
The underlying solutions to such a force structure really need to be addressed with organizational vision, training, and more training. I'm a supporter of a two-headed beast in terms of National and Expeditionary force structures:
* One is prepared to over match and defeat formal militaries anywhere in the world.
* The other is structured with a very long-term regional orientation, with highly-trained personnel who know the languages, cultures, and underlying currents of their assigned Areas of Operations at the Theater and Regional Levels.
It basically starts with a childhood training pipeline for those who know they are geared for the warrior and diplomatic class. It involves military-diplomatic schooling, including foreign language and cultural immersion programs, a constant program of studying geography, history, and martial subjects with half of the day focused on more cerebral modes, while the other half of the school day focuses on hands-on application of principles.
Our current military suffers from systemic leadership failures, and succeeds only because of a minority warrior class of professionals who have to fight the system to gain mission accomplishment, combined with the most powerful military industrial complex known to man.
It is hopeless to attempt to change the military from within using existing and outdated institutions, so you must start with the next generation of soldiers in the private sector, and build the leadership structure from outside before they enter. Give me half of the resources available to the initial entry, NCO development, Officer Training, and long-term professional development schools of the Army, and I will channel 10 times the soldier the government could ever hope to mentor and develop.
The standards that the Special Operations community demand from enlisted and officer candidates are what should be very baseline for entry-level combat arms enlisted, and officer duty positions, and the only way to accomplish that is in the private sector.
The question then becomes, how do we increase the load-carrying capability of belt-fed weapons, to include vehicle-mounted ones, which do the most killing anyway.
Michael, thanks for your comments. They are an excellent summary of the concepts of force structuring and defense matters when taking a realistic view into account. The implications for dismounted and mounted blue force combatants turns away from 19th century regimentation structures, and really calls on organizational flexibility for mission types, ambiguities in regional, cultural, and political dynamics, with limited and precise application of violence in the events that call for it.
The underlying solutions to such a force structure really need to be addressed with organizational vision, training, and more training. I'm a supporter of a two-headed beast in terms of National and Expeditionary force structures:
* One is prepared to over match and defeat formal militaries anywhere in the world.
* The other is structured with a very long-term regional orientation, with highly-trained personnel who know the languages, cultures, and underlying currents of their assigned Areas of Operations at the Theater and Regional Levels.
It basically starts with a childhood training pipeline for those who know they are geared for the warrior and diplomatic class. It involves military-diplomatic schooling, including foreign language and cultural immersion programs, a constant program of studying geography, history, and martial subjects with half of the day focused on more cerebral modes, while the other half of the school day focuses on hands-on application of principles.
Our current military suffers from systemic leadership failures, and succeeds only because of a minority warrior class of professionals who have to fight the system to gain mission accomplishment, combined with the most powerful military industrial complex known to man.
It is hopeless to attempt to change the military from within using existing and outdated institutions, so you must start with the next generation of soldiers in the private sector, and build the leadership structure from outside before they enter. Give me half of the resources available to the initial entry, NCO development, Officer Training, and long-term professional development schools of the Army, and I will channel 10 times the soldier the government could ever hope to mentor and develop.
The standards that the Special Operations community demand from enlisted and officer candidates are what should be very baseline for entry-level combat arms enlisted, and officer duty positions, and the only way to accomplish that is in the private sector.