04-11-2014, 05:56 PM
JASmith – You are correct, there are a lot of conflicting pieces of data, and we in the military have historically tended to focus on the last war when designing our systems ant tactics. There have been some who looked ahead- or at the current situation- and went against the grain in their conduct of warfare (LGen ‘Brute’ Krulak and how Marines fought in I Corps in the mid-60s comes to mind, as does J-SOC forces in ‘01-‘02). We also have a tendency to focus on the enemies’, or perceived enemies’ Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) as opposed to the enemies’ Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA). There is a growing group within the military and government that see the fallacy of fighting the last war – or preparing for the MDCOA at the expense of preparing for the MLCOA.
One of the classes I have taught over the last several years has been ‘Evolution of Warfare’. In that class we look at how warfare has evolved over the last 2000 years and where it is heading. I spent a lot of time doing research, reading and applying my own hard earned lessons learned in the process of educating the future officers. Based on a lot of reading, I have come to the following hypothesizes;
1) Full scale war – conventional or non-conventional - with an equal or near equal state competitor is unlikely. Global diplomacy, economies and information systems (three of the four areas of national power, the fourth being military) are too interconnected and interdependent. Again, it is unlikely, not impossible. I see this as the MDCOA. We still must be prepared for 3d generation warfare.
2) As of right now, no other nation state has the ability to project force to the extent of the U.S. . There are those who are trying, but it is not their focus of effort, and it is highly unlikely anyone will reach the potential to forward deploy a force of any size for at least 30 years. IE Invasion U.S.A. from a state actor doesn’t keep me up at night.
3) Unilateral action by a single nation state against a weaker state or non-state actor would have dramatic economic, diplomatic and military repercussions from the rest of the world. This is evident by current backlash against Russia.
4) Urban sprawl and discontent/poverty/class separation within the littoral regions of 3rd and 4th world nations (and it is encroaching into the traditional 1st world) will continue to impact global security, trade, travel and information sharing to the point a state actor – or group of state actors - will be forced to become involved (see the Arab Spring). As mentioned in point 2) we’re it when it comes to being able to project force, so it will most likely be a U.S. led/sponsored force.
5) Since the point of friction is the urban 3rd/4th world terrain, that is where we will most likely close with and fight the enemy. This terrain will be dominated by restricted maneuver and movement, and the enemy will most likely be non-state actors (may be funded/supported by agitator states) who hides among people who are neutral or non-participants. In order to maintain coalition and worldwide support, the state actors must be very judicious in the application of military power IOT avoid collateral damage, or turning a neutral party/person into an enemy by killing their family. This last scenario is, in the opinions of a lot of smart folks, the MLCOA for the future of our military operations and is considered 4th generation warfare.
So what does this mean? When you are talking MDCOA/3rd generation warfare, you are talking planes and missiles, with the possibility of large armored forces. When you are talking the MLCOA/4th generation warfare, you are talking about smaller lighter units on the ground – Reg/BN sized infantry units, SOF, maybe even some light armor.
In trying to sum up some stuff, and get this thread back on track, I would recommend everyone who wants to talk about the future small arms/individual weapons of the future; Consider what will be most applicable in a non-permissive urban environment with a lot of neutral civilians to hide the bad guys. Big calibers with the ability to over-penetrate a target may not be the answer.
One of the classes I have taught over the last several years has been ‘Evolution of Warfare’. In that class we look at how warfare has evolved over the last 2000 years and where it is heading. I spent a lot of time doing research, reading and applying my own hard earned lessons learned in the process of educating the future officers. Based on a lot of reading, I have come to the following hypothesizes;
1) Full scale war – conventional or non-conventional - with an equal or near equal state competitor is unlikely. Global diplomacy, economies and information systems (three of the four areas of national power, the fourth being military) are too interconnected and interdependent. Again, it is unlikely, not impossible. I see this as the MDCOA. We still must be prepared for 3d generation warfare.
2) As of right now, no other nation state has the ability to project force to the extent of the U.S. . There are those who are trying, but it is not their focus of effort, and it is highly unlikely anyone will reach the potential to forward deploy a force of any size for at least 30 years. IE Invasion U.S.A. from a state actor doesn’t keep me up at night.
3) Unilateral action by a single nation state against a weaker state or non-state actor would have dramatic economic, diplomatic and military repercussions from the rest of the world. This is evident by current backlash against Russia.
4) Urban sprawl and discontent/poverty/class separation within the littoral regions of 3rd and 4th world nations (and it is encroaching into the traditional 1st world) will continue to impact global security, trade, travel and information sharing to the point a state actor – or group of state actors - will be forced to become involved (see the Arab Spring). As mentioned in point 2) we’re it when it comes to being able to project force, so it will most likely be a U.S. led/sponsored force.
5) Since the point of friction is the urban 3rd/4th world terrain, that is where we will most likely close with and fight the enemy. This terrain will be dominated by restricted maneuver and movement, and the enemy will most likely be non-state actors (may be funded/supported by agitator states) who hides among people who are neutral or non-participants. In order to maintain coalition and worldwide support, the state actors must be very judicious in the application of military power IOT avoid collateral damage, or turning a neutral party/person into an enemy by killing their family. This last scenario is, in the opinions of a lot of smart folks, the MLCOA for the future of our military operations and is considered 4th generation warfare.
So what does this mean? When you are talking MDCOA/3rd generation warfare, you are talking planes and missiles, with the possibility of large armored forces. When you are talking the MLCOA/4th generation warfare, you are talking about smaller lighter units on the ground – Reg/BN sized infantry units, SOF, maybe even some light armor.
In trying to sum up some stuff, and get this thread back on track, I would recommend everyone who wants to talk about the future small arms/individual weapons of the future; Consider what will be most applicable in a non-permissive urban environment with a lot of neutral civilians to hide the bad guys. Big calibers with the ability to over-penetrate a target may not be the answer.