Third Generation Battle Rifle

[LRRPF52]

The basis of the case for adopting a .22 cal rifle was the combat studies which showed that nearly all small-arms fights took place within 300 yards. Within that range they thought light bullets fired at a high velocity would be fine, as they would maximise the hit probability while halving weight. They then seemed to lose confidence in this and started to demand longer-range performance, but it doesn't seem to have occurred to them that in that case, maybe a small .22 wasn't the best starting point.

The reliance on dumping energy into the target with the SCHV concept has as much merit as it does, as long as the bullet stays above fragmentation threshold, which is hard to extend range-wise with a lightweight and narrow projectile. 200yds is about right for any 20" gun with M193, and the carbines really don't suffer as much as is portrayed in the gun rags. The BC drives energy loss more than anything.

The hit probability was demonstrably increased in looking at entry-level shooting scores, who have basically no real recoil to deal with, and a very flat-shooting cartridge for distances out to 200m. Then there were the AGILE reports from initial fielding with ARVN units, with US Advisors in-tow, many of whom had a lot of combat experience from WWII and Korea. Everyone seemed to be impressed with the different wound ballistics 5.56 generated, and a lot of what I've seen first-hand supports the same type of wound characteristics.

Add to that the unprecedented combat load a soldier could carry, and 5.56 makes a lot of sense for most of your Infantry Riflemen to carry, especially in geographic regions where engagement distances were well within 200yds.

The real areas where the Army and DoD failed us were with the SAW's chambering, and letting Infantry Squads get TO&E'd out all with 5.56 weapons, while getting rid of the Squad Marksman, Scout, and Assistant Squad Leader, then adopting the stupid Train-Fire marksmanship program oriented to conscripts shooting from fighting positions in the defense with a Soviet Armored and Motorized Infantry threat rolling through the Fulda Gap. Of course, during the Cold War, it made sense to have focus on what was anticipated as the main threat, but there really needed to be at least a contingency force structure for all the wars and LIC's we have actually fought both during and after the Cold War.



The same is true today. I'm not seeing a lot of evidence that the Army has at least 2 coherent Force Postures other than demand-driven trends in OIF and OEF, particularly WRT IED-resistant vehicles that are inappropriate for a conventional war, the stupidity of cordon-and-search habits of heavy units in OIF, and the insanity of COPs in ISAF.

The only sensible small arms weapon system for an organization that refuses to allow talented and qualified officers to write doctrine is to reduce the weight of current systems, without sacrificing capability. A new standard service rifle/carbine won't do that, especially not in a larger caliber.

A new LMG that can displace some of the 7.62 belt-fed weapons with a lighter ammunition footprint would benefit even the worst offenders, no matter how illogical the chain of command and leadership climate was, because machine gunners will typically engage targets at longer distances and there is a system in-place that is mandated Army-wide to ensure they at least get transition range training, which is a fun range to shoot.

In short, we need a 3rd Generation LMG if anything, and the organization needs to support the recently-adopted TO&E of DM's in the Infantry Squad by creating a program to sustain the skill sets that DM's need to have to be as effective as they can be. The equipment comes after that.