06-26-2013, 02:17 PM
Michael,
Good info -- problem is that the exceptions tend to drive the interest. We can be reasonably sure that all of our equipment and expendables are designed and maintained so that the 80th percentile is well-handled. The idea is that the costs of development and production skyrocket when every eventuality is covered. Further the burden on individual soldiers increases to where they can't carry enough ammunition to engage with the tactics they have been trained to use.
When it is discovered that something doesn't cover the 80th percentile, however, there is a scramble to find a fix.
The problem is, and this a a problem I have been annoyed with since the mid-70s when I first entered the weapons analysis and design world with more than 36 months in the Vietnam theater is "What about that remaining 20 per cent?" In the current context, the procurement community accepts that at least one time out of five, the engagement range is outside the design capability of the individual weapon.
If I understand correctly, this is the point where the combined arms argument is brought into play. We don't need long-range individual weapons because we have all those other assets that are perfectly capable of taking out a sniper or machine gun nest that is outside the reach to the squad complement.
There are penalties associated with the increased level of violence implied by using heavier and frequently airborne weaponry.
My point is that this debate has existed since Org told Morg that his rock was too small...
The final point is that I believe our soldiers and Marines are poorly served by not having the ability to obtain weapons tailored to the expectations of today's patrol, rather than expectations of averages over the coming thirty years of conflict.
Good info -- problem is that the exceptions tend to drive the interest. We can be reasonably sure that all of our equipment and expendables are designed and maintained so that the 80th percentile is well-handled. The idea is that the costs of development and production skyrocket when every eventuality is covered. Further the burden on individual soldiers increases to where they can't carry enough ammunition to engage with the tactics they have been trained to use.
When it is discovered that something doesn't cover the 80th percentile, however, there is a scramble to find a fix.
The problem is, and this a a problem I have been annoyed with since the mid-70s when I first entered the weapons analysis and design world with more than 36 months in the Vietnam theater is "What about that remaining 20 per cent?" In the current context, the procurement community accepts that at least one time out of five, the engagement range is outside the design capability of the individual weapon.
If I understand correctly, this is the point where the combined arms argument is brought into play. We don't need long-range individual weapons because we have all those other assets that are perfectly capable of taking out a sniper or machine gun nest that is outside the reach to the squad complement.
There are penalties associated with the increased level of violence implied by using heavier and frequently airborne weaponry.
My point is that this debate has existed since Org told Morg that his rock was too small...
The final point is that I believe our soldiers and Marines are poorly served by not having the ability to obtain weapons tailored to the expectations of today's patrol, rather than expectations of averages over the coming thirty years of conflict.