06-13-2013, 01:59 PM
When you go to a T65-based case, you're back to the invalidated battle rifle concept again. Kicking the dead horse.
Our marksmanship training was woefully inadequate in the Army, because it's based on the "Train Fire" concept of conscripts in the defense at the Fulda Gap firing from foxholes and prone positions in a defense against Soviet Motorized columns. I haven't seen any indication that we have gotten away from that. One of the only things to really change in marksmanship training is more focus on various CQM packages-some almost worthless, and others pretty good, especially as you get closer to Ranger Regiment experience.
We are in for a major need to overhaul the doctrinal concepts of how Infantry soldiers should be employed, considering the changes in expected engagements based on realistic future threats. There really needs to be at least two force postures and doctrines: One for conventional warfare, and one for Asymmetric or Unconventional Warfare. Since nobody in their right mind wants to engage us where our strengths are, AW/UW makes a lot more sense, and so it has been since before most of us were born.
As far as service rifles and carbines go, the caliber won't make a huge difference on the outcome. Training, on the other hand, will be extremely deterministic in all outcomes. I just finished reading The Circuit, by Bob Shepherd, and his observations are very indicative of systemic problems in the US's approach to overseas deployments that match what I have witnessed. We are painfully ignorant, for the most part, about anything outside the US´with regard to geography, history, cultures, creeds, nations, tribes, and interpersonal dynamics that really drive the centers of power wherever we deploy.
As far as training goes, we lack basic professional conduct-even according to out own limited doctrine, TTP's, and institutional learning centers, and he documents incident after incident where basic soldiering skills, particularly at the leadership levels, were completely lacking. He's a retired SAS guy who became a security advisor for journalists, and experienced some pivotal events all over the Middle East since he was mitigating the security for journalists who were actually out trying to go to the heart of stories, rather than sit back at the hotel. This led him to meeting Yasser Arafat (he stole his flag too, get the book-it's worth the read), the leader of Hamas (CNN interview), Taliban warlords, ANA counter-drug police dog-and-pony shows, Osama Bin Laden's brother-in-law, and a whole host of other key figures in the region (most of whom are dead now).
His critiques about US force protection posture are most appropriate since he identified basic failures every time he visited a US COP or FOB. Things like unmanned guard towers, failure to do the Five S's with POW's, insane patrolling excursions with no value, positioning of COP's under the high ground in extremely vulnerable kill zones, Infantry Lieutenants using dead-reckoning land nav techniques in the mountains of Afghanistan, sacrificing riflemen to pull security for embedded journalists rather than run their normal positions in the order of movement, and on and on.
He had Public Affairs Officers exercise vendettas that jeopardized his life, and the lives of his guards needlessly. He also fought systemic problems in the deployed media management when it came to security and trying to advise desk-drivers about the risks of CP work, and duly recognized issues with UK firms as well that were clearly way out of their sector by employing unqualified personnel for Close Protection details, leaving teams improperly equipped and out-gunned, with broken vehicles and unfair pay.
His observations and experiences reminded me of the same culture I seemed to buffet against, which is basically one of people warming seats and getting pay checks, who really could care less about being professionals, or were never shown how to be professionals, and have continued bad habits in ignorance. With a system like this, a new caliber will only makes things worse. We have to fix things that require a brain-transplant, and that ain't gonna happen.
Our marksmanship training was woefully inadequate in the Army, because it's based on the "Train Fire" concept of conscripts in the defense at the Fulda Gap firing from foxholes and prone positions in a defense against Soviet Motorized columns. I haven't seen any indication that we have gotten away from that. One of the only things to really change in marksmanship training is more focus on various CQM packages-some almost worthless, and others pretty good, especially as you get closer to Ranger Regiment experience.
We are in for a major need to overhaul the doctrinal concepts of how Infantry soldiers should be employed, considering the changes in expected engagements based on realistic future threats. There really needs to be at least two force postures and doctrines: One for conventional warfare, and one for Asymmetric or Unconventional Warfare. Since nobody in their right mind wants to engage us where our strengths are, AW/UW makes a lot more sense, and so it has been since before most of us were born.
As far as service rifles and carbines go, the caliber won't make a huge difference on the outcome. Training, on the other hand, will be extremely deterministic in all outcomes. I just finished reading The Circuit, by Bob Shepherd, and his observations are very indicative of systemic problems in the US's approach to overseas deployments that match what I have witnessed. We are painfully ignorant, for the most part, about anything outside the US´with regard to geography, history, cultures, creeds, nations, tribes, and interpersonal dynamics that really drive the centers of power wherever we deploy.
As far as training goes, we lack basic professional conduct-even according to out own limited doctrine, TTP's, and institutional learning centers, and he documents incident after incident where basic soldiering skills, particularly at the leadership levels, were completely lacking. He's a retired SAS guy who became a security advisor for journalists, and experienced some pivotal events all over the Middle East since he was mitigating the security for journalists who were actually out trying to go to the heart of stories, rather than sit back at the hotel. This led him to meeting Yasser Arafat (he stole his flag too, get the book-it's worth the read), the leader of Hamas (CNN interview), Taliban warlords, ANA counter-drug police dog-and-pony shows, Osama Bin Laden's brother-in-law, and a whole host of other key figures in the region (most of whom are dead now).
His critiques about US force protection posture are most appropriate since he identified basic failures every time he visited a US COP or FOB. Things like unmanned guard towers, failure to do the Five S's with POW's, insane patrolling excursions with no value, positioning of COP's under the high ground in extremely vulnerable kill zones, Infantry Lieutenants using dead-reckoning land nav techniques in the mountains of Afghanistan, sacrificing riflemen to pull security for embedded journalists rather than run their normal positions in the order of movement, and on and on.
He had Public Affairs Officers exercise vendettas that jeopardized his life, and the lives of his guards needlessly. He also fought systemic problems in the deployed media management when it came to security and trying to advise desk-drivers about the risks of CP work, and duly recognized issues with UK firms as well that were clearly way out of their sector by employing unqualified personnel for Close Protection details, leaving teams improperly equipped and out-gunned, with broken vehicles and unfair pay.
His observations and experiences reminded me of the same culture I seemed to buffet against, which is basically one of people warming seats and getting pay checks, who really could care less about being professionals, or were never shown how to be professionals, and have continued bad habits in ignorance. With a system like this, a new caliber will only makes things worse. We have to fix things that require a brain-transplant, and that ain't gonna happen.