Extracts from SCOTUS decision vacating a MA law restricting stun gun:
Instead, the court seized on language, originating in
United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939), that “ ‘the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” ’ ” 470 Mass., at 778, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692 (quoting Heller, supra, at 627, in turn quoting Miller, supra, at179). That quotation does not mean, as the court below thought, that only weapons popular in 1789 are covered bythe Second Amendment. It simply reflects the reality that the founding-era militia consisted of citizens “who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty,” Heller, 554 U. S., at 627, and that the Second Amendment accordingly guarantees the right to carry weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,” id., at 625.
As to “dangerous,” the court below held that a weapon is “dangerous per se” if it is “‘designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm’ and ‘for the purpose of bodily assault or defense.’ ” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d,at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296,303, 402 N. E. 2d 1051, 1056 (1980)). That test may be appropriate for applying statutes criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon. See ibid., 402 N. E. 2d, at 1056. But it cannot be used to identify arms that fall outside the Second Amendment. First, the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller,supra, at 627 (contrasting “‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ ” that may be banned with protected “weapons . . . ‘incommon use at the time’”
. Second, even in cases where dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial Court’s test sweeps far too broadly. Heller defined the“Arms” covered by the Second Amendment to include “‘anything that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.’”554 U. S., at 581. Under the decision below, however,virtually every covered arm would qualify as “dangerous.”
Were there any doubt on this point, one need only lookat the court’s first example of “dangerous per se” weapons:“firearms.” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692. If Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous. 554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Common*wealth’s own witness described as “non-lethal force,” Tr.27, cannot be banned on that basis.
See https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15...8_aplc.pdf
Instead, the court seized on language, originating in
United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939), that “ ‘the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” ’ ” 470 Mass., at 778, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692 (quoting Heller, supra, at 627, in turn quoting Miller, supra, at179). That quotation does not mean, as the court below thought, that only weapons popular in 1789 are covered bythe Second Amendment. It simply reflects the reality that the founding-era militia consisted of citizens “who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty,” Heller, 554 U. S., at 627, and that the Second Amendment accordingly guarantees the right to carry weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,” id., at 625.
As to “dangerous,” the court below held that a weapon is “dangerous per se” if it is “‘designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm’ and ‘for the purpose of bodily assault or defense.’ ” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d,at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296,303, 402 N. E. 2d 1051, 1056 (1980)). That test may be appropriate for applying statutes criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon. See ibid., 402 N. E. 2d, at 1056. But it cannot be used to identify arms that fall outside the Second Amendment. First, the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller,supra, at 627 (contrasting “‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ ” that may be banned with protected “weapons . . . ‘incommon use at the time’”
. Second, even in cases where dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial Court’s test sweeps far too broadly. Heller defined the“Arms” covered by the Second Amendment to include “‘anything that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.’”554 U. S., at 581. Under the decision below, however,virtually every covered arm would qualify as “dangerous.”Were there any doubt on this point, one need only lookat the court’s first example of “dangerous per se” weapons:“firearms.” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692. If Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous. 554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Common*wealth’s own witness described as “non-lethal force,” Tr.27, cannot be banned on that basis.
See https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15...8_aplc.pdf
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